Kavita Paul

Southern Africa Environmental Project

6 June 2000

I. Statement of Purpose . . . . . . . 4

II. Marine Environment of South Africa . . . . . . . 4

III. Industry Background . . . . . . . 5
    Demersal Fishery . . . . . . . 6
    Pelagic Fishery . . . . . . . 7
    Rock Lobster Fishery . . . . . . . 7
    Line Fishery . . . . . . . . 8
    Squid Fishery . . . . . . . 9
    Abalone Fishery . . . . . . . 9
A. Legislative History
    Preliminary Measures of Management . . . . . . . 10
    Environmental Development of the 1970s . . . . . . . 11
    Sea Fisheries Act (12 of 1988) . . . . . . . 13
B. The New Government’s Plans for Transformation of the Industry . . . . . . . 14
    Access . . . . . . . 15
    Research . . . . . . . 16
    Industry Restructuring . . . . . . . 17
    Management of the Resource . . . . . . . 18
    Enforcement . . . . . . . 19
    Government Structures . . . . . . . 20
C. Marine Living Resources Act (18 of 1998) . . . . . . . 23
    Introductory Provisions . . . . . . . 24
    Consultative Advisory Forum . . . . . . . 24
    Register . . . . . . . 25
    The Minister . . . . . . . 25
    Subsistence Fishing . . . . . . . 26
    Recreational Fishing . . . . . . . 26
    Commercial Fishing . . . . . . . 26
    Fisheries Transformation Council . . . . . . . 27
    Foreign and High Seas Fishing . . . . . . . 27
    Marine Protected Areas . . . . . . . 28
    Prohibited Fishing Methods . . . . . . . 28
    Law Enforcement . . . . . . . 29
    Judicial Matters . . . . . . . 29
    General Provisions . . . . . . . 29
    Appeals to the Minister and Granting of Exemptions . . . . . . . 30
    Repeals . . . . . . . 30

IV. Situation After 1998 (Implementation of the Marine Living Resources Act)
A. Sector-specific transformation . . . . . . . 31
    Deep Sea Trawling and Long-line Fishing . . . . . . . 31
    Linefish . . . . . . . 32
    Pelagic and purse-seine fishing . . . . . . . 33
    Squid . . . . . . . 35
    Rock Lobster . . . . . . . 36
B. Stakeholder transformation
    Subsistence sector
    Small-scale and medium-sized enterprises
    Unions
    Foreign vessels and international agreements
    Research
    Large commercial sector
    Government
C. Quota transformation
    The system
    'Paper’ quotas and "joint ventures"

V. Case Study: Abalone of the Western Cape
A. Background
    Species
    Exploitation
    Resource
B. Poaching of abalone
    Hawston poaching situation
    Hangklip-Kleinmond poaching situation
    Betty’s Bay Marine Reserve
C. Enforcement
    MCM inspectors
    South African Police Service
    Operation Neptune
    Sea Watch
D. Transformation of the abalone industry
    Divers’ rights
    Commercial companies
    Subsistence and informal sector
E. Solutions to abalone poaching
    Government
    Enforcement
    Education
    Co-management
    Mariculture

VI. Conclusions and recommendations

Exploitation of South Africa’s rich marine living resources has generated controversy since the development of a commercial fishing industry began about fifty years ago. It has gained particular notice within recent years as the new government has attempted to improve conservational management of the resource and address historical inequities of access entrenched by apartheid system. It is the purpose of this paper to provide a comprehensive examination of the industry both before and after the inception of the new government in order to determine if transformation has in fact occurred. Through describing the industry’s environmental, sector, and legislative background, it is in the interest of this paper to illustrate the situation prior to 1994. It is only through examining the problems identified by the new government and the provisions of the marine policy recently enacted, however, that the foundation for industry transformation becomes evident. This paper seeks to provide an analysis of the present situation of the fishing industry by exploring those policies and recommendations that have been implemented, and examining what their effect on the industry has been. A case study on the abalone (perlemoen) of the Western Cape was chosen to illustrate the transformation’s effect on one particular sector of the industry. The problems identified and solutions offered within the abalone case study typify those which are applicable, in varying degrees, to other sectors of the South African Fishery.

The oceanic waters of South Africa are one of the most dynamic ecosystems in the world. Hosting 16% of the world’s species of fish,these waters are both abundant in marine life and rich in biodiversity. This unique marine environment is primarily due to the interaction between South Africa’s two oceanic forces: the Benguela and Agulhas currents.

The cold, nutrient rich Benguela current is the driving force of the West Coast of South Africa. Originating from the deep waters of the ocean, the current reaches the surface through a natural phenomenon called upwelling. Upwelling occurs when winds blow surface waters away from the land, thus creating a vacuum. Waters from the deeper parts of the ocean then move in to replace the missing volume of water. This deep water is rich in nitrogen, phosphorous, and other plant nutrients, which is used by phytoplankton as they develop. Phytoplankton feeds the plant eating fish, which in turn feeds the flesh-eating fish, explaining the abundance and high productivity of marine resources on the West Coast.

The Agulhas, on the other hand, is a warm current, which flows over the huge continental shelf of the East Coast. Despite the occurrence of thermoclines and the productive nature of continental shelves, the East Coast is considerably less productive than the West Coast although it is equally important. The East Coast is home to high species diversity and is contributes to the productivity of the West. The temperate, relatively shallow shelf of the Agulhas bank provides a good breeding area for many species of fish, which lay their eggs in the bank and the Agulhas current transports these eggs and larvae to the Benguela system where they feed and grow. Therefore, the Agulhas plays a fundamental role in restocking the Benguela system.

The fishing industry is an important sector of the South African economy, employing 25, 000 people in the commercial sector, 60 000 people in related sectors, and grossing around 2.5 billion rand a year. The industry is generally divided into five categories: demersal, pelagic, rock lobster, line fishery, and "other" including the abalone and squid fisheries.

Demersal fishery
The demersal fishery is the most valuable sector of the South African fishing industry, in terms of income generated, bringing in over 500 million rand per year. The deep-sea trawler dominates this sector, specifically targeting the hake species, although kingklip, horse mackerel, and snoek often form the by-catch. Bottom-trawling for hake grew rapidly after World War II, peaking in the early 1970s at 300,000 tons. Soon thereafter, the stock suffered a sharp decline as a result of over-exploitation by foreign fleets and mismanagement of the resource. This plummet prompted several regulatory measures including minimum mesh size, the exclusion of foreign vessels, the designation of an exclusive fishing zone, and other conservative management strategies. After 1983, there were signs of a gradual recovery of the hake stock and the total allowable catch was set at 120 000 tons. Today, the TAC has moved to 150 000 tons.

Management strategies for the deep-sea sector are complicated. On the one hand, fish in this sector have a long life so there are more age classes that can be fished, and there is a lower risk of over-exploitation. On the other hand, their productivity is lower than fish in other sectors so it takes much longer for species to recover from long term over- exploitation. As shown earlier, the hake stock is still recovering from the over-exploitation of the 1960s and 70s, despite heightened management. Strategies include TACs, specifications for gear, company quotas for hake, and prohibition of operating in specific bays and inshore areas.

Pelagic fishery
The pelagic fishery is the largest sector in terms of volume. It is dominated by the purse-seine sector, which harvests the small fish near the surface (primarily anchovy, sardine, and round herring). Some of the catch, e.g., sardine, is canned for eating however a large part is used for industrial purposes (e.g., producing fish meal and fish oil). There have been high fluctuations in the pelagic catch, oscillating between 350 000 tons and 450 000 tons between 1975 and 1990, then dropping to 214 000 tons in 1992. Over-fishing caused a collapse in the sardine stock in 1966 thus anchovy has dominated the pelagic recruitment for the past thirty years. Recently however, the sardine stock has seemed to make a comeback while the anchovy is dwindling. New management policies may be forthcoming.

After the 1960s, many regulatory measures were implemented, including mesh size requirements, company quotas, and TACs. The pelagic stock has been relatively stable since the early 1990s.

Rock lobster fishery
The rock lobster (also known locally as kreef) fishery is an important sector of the industry, bringing in around 90 million rand a year. Fishermen on the West Coast operate in rocky inshore areas, using hoop nets or rectangular traps to catch the lobster. Larger vessels and baited plastic traps are used to catch the deep-water lobsters of the South Coast. Poaching is high in this sector due to the lucrative nature of the species; thus the statistics received are often unreliable. It is known, however, that the average growth has declined, and the catch has decreased from 10,000 tons in the 1960s, to 2300 tons in 1998 (1900 tons for the West and 400 tons for the South). This decline is due partly to mismanagement and partly to a decrease in mussels, the primary source of food for the lobster.

The West Coast commercial fishery is controlled by company quotas, which are allocated for a subdivided geographic area. The entire industry is regulated through TACs, closed season, and minimum size requirements.

Line fishery
The line fishery has existed for centuries, spanning the entire South African coast, and targeting several different types of species. This sector focuses primarily on harvesting tuna, snoek, kob, and yellowtail. Kingklip used to be the most valuable fish in this sector until over-exploitation of the 1980s did great damage to the stock. The fishery was targeting those adults who moved inshore to breed, thus affecting their capacity to reproduce. Despite the complete closure of the fishery, the stock is still recovering. A similar scenario is now occurring with the tuna. In the 1960s, the sector began targeting yellow-fin tuna, until it experienced a collapse in 1980. The fishery then moved to albacore and is currently operating beyond the maximum sustainable yield. Despite these local threats to the resource, foreign fleets such as those of Japan and Taiwan are still operating in South African waters. Given both the long-lining and bottom-trawling pressure on the stock, the future of the tuna is bleak. Unfortunately, the entire industry is experiencing a dramatic decrease in total catch and may be on the brink of an over-fishing crisis.

The management of this sector is complex, varying with the type of species itself. For example, there is no restriction on abundant species like kob, chub mackerel, horse mackerel and snoek. However, there is a strict restriction on South Africa’s indigenous species like red Roman, steenbras, stumpnose and galjoen. These vulnerable, highly prized table fish are facing a very critical phase of over-exploitation. Despite management measures like closed seasons, minimum size limits, TACs, and legal protection, the number of long-line fishermen is rising annually and the stock is increasingly being threatened.

Squid fishery
The squid-jigging or "chokka" fishery is a very important sector in the Eastern Cape bringing in 50 million rand a year. Initiated in 1983, squid-jigging uses lights and bait at night to attract and hook (jig) the squid. The companies operate during the squids spawning season, which is when the squid aggregate into schools and move inshore. Boats make special efforts to operate in the water column, avoiding the sea floor where the females lay their eggs. Regulations in the squid fishery include a TAC, a closed season of three to five weeks, and a limited number of licenses issued.

Abalone fishery
Abalone (known locally as perlemoen) is the most lucrative species in the South African fishing industry. The fishery is divided into seven geographic fishing zones, from Hangklip to Quoin Point, although much of the commercial catch is harvested from only five. The abalone are caught by divers in the shallow sub-tidal kelp beds; commercial divers use small dinghies and scuba gear while recreational and subsistence fishermen are only allowed to use a snorkel. The TAC has been set at around 600 tons since the 1990s, bringing in over 25 million rand a year. Much of the catch is frozen and exported to the Far East, where abalone is considered a delicacy and commands a very high price.

The management of the abalone resource has been a point of contention, especially given the lucrative nature of the species. Although the TAC has been stable for the past few years, it is dramatically lower than its past recruitment (3000 tons were taken in 1965). Statistics are currently skewed as a result of rampant poaching in the sector, and it is suspected that the recreational and subsistence fishermen are taking almost as much as the commercial. Despite minimum size requirements, permit requirements, TACs, closed seasons, and the establishment of marine reserves, the future of the abalone in South Africa is not promising, as the case study in a subsequent section demonstrates.

Preliminary measures of management

The laws governing the fishing industry in South Africa stem from the Roman Law, which classified fish as res nullius, meaning ‘objects not owned’ but still capable of private ownership. (Clarification needed as to the meaning of this designation) The Roman Dutch Law designated the seashore to be res publica, meaning that the feudal lords could act as custodians of the shore in the interest of the people.

The conservation of living marine resources in South Africa dates back to 1895 when the government of Cape Colony appointed a biologist to undertake fish surveys. This was terminated at the start of the South African war in 1899, then resumed part time between 1918 and 1928. At this point, the Division of Sea Fisheries was established within the Department of Mine and Industry, which became the Department of Commerce and Industry in 1940.

The first legislation regulating activities on the coast, was the Sea Shore Act 21 of 1935, which designated the State President as owner of the coastal areas. The Act stated that the area ‘may not be alienated or let,’ but failed to protect the public in regards to access; it simply relied on public obedience. The act did, however, introduce a certain measure of regulation by prohibiting the removal of material from the shore and sea, and by establishing control over environmental nuisances. (What sort of environmental nuisances?) During the apartheid period, the Act came to be tool for segregation and differentiation between the different classes of land users.

A more comprehensive statute, the Sea Fisheries Act 10 of 1940, replaced the Act of 1935. (? – Apartheid was not officially instituted until 1948 – how could the previous Act have been a tool of apartheid if it was replaced) This was the first statute to regulate sea fisheries through national legislation, provincial ordinances, and local authority. Although the act later established five marine reserves (that were very limited in area and scope), it was aimed more at the marketing aspect of sea fisheries than conservation.

Environmental development of the 1970s

Between 1960 and 1970, a fundamental change was required in the fisheries legislation of South Africa. First of all, a biological crisis occurred in the marine environment. To the north, Namibia was suffering from irreparable damage when its sardine catch plummeted from 1.4 million tons in 1968 to 4000 tons in 1977, resulting in the loss of 8000 jobs. To the south, in the Benguela upwelling system, South Africa’s pelagic fishery was also facing chaos (?) as the catch fell from 400 000 tons in 1963 to 16 000 tons in 1974. This realization that marine resources are not, in fact, inexhaustible, along with increasing worldwide environmental awareness and activism, prompted South Africa to initiate a comprehensive approach to fisheries management.

Reflective of this turning point are four commissions of inquiry instituted between 1972 and 1986, which addressed the following issues: (1) the utilization of fish and other living marine resources of South Africa, (2) the conservation and utilization of living marine resources of the Republic of South Africa, (3) The exploitation of pelagic fish resources of South Africa, and (4), the allocation of quotas for the exploitation of living marine resources (1986). These papers, along with the extension of the Department of Environmental Affairs’ jurisdiction to include sea fisheries show a heightened governmental concern for proper marine resource management.

Also important was a major international development regarding national jurisdiction over ocean waters. Prior to the 1970s, international law only recognized a narrow exclusive fishing zone of 12 nautical miles for each coastal nation. All waters beyond 12 nautical miles fell subject to the regulations of various commissions, South Africa’s being the International Commission for the South East Atlantic Fisheries. Despite the administrative existence of the ICSEAF, which was mainly concerned with the hake industry, the deep sea sector of the South African fishing industry suffered greatly from foreign competition and over-exploitation.

After the mid-1970s and the Law of the Sea Convention in 1982, international law recognized the need for exclusive control over coastal resources. It was declared that coastal states could claim 200 nautical miles of Exclusive Economic Zone, in that they had the sovereign right to explore, exploit, conserve, and manage the natural resources of this area. All foreign vessels in the EEZ were subject to the laws of that coastal state and it was that state’s responsibility to maintain the maximum sustainable yield and utilization of those marine living resources. South Africa formalized the international customary law through its Territorial Waters Act of 1977, declaring an Exclusive Fishing Zone (EFZ) of 200 nautical miles. This declaration of an EFZ was fundamental in the recovery of the hake and sardine stock in South African waters.

Sea Fisheries Act (12 of 1988)

The Sea Fisheries Act (12 of 1988) represented a marked change from previous legislation. The purpose of the act was to provide for the conservation of marine ecosystems and the orderly exploitation, utilization, and protection of certain marine resources (designed to cover the 200 nautical miles of the EFZ). The managerial aspect of the act was a new and important feature of national policy for marine resources. It incorporated such ideals as sustainability through conservation and regulatory measures.

The Act granted most of the power of fisheries management (e.g., determining optimal tonnage or TACs for each species, granting licenses for vessels and factories, specifying regulations for fishing gear, and establishing marine reserves) to the Minister of Environmental Affairs. The Act also provided for establishment of a Sea Fisheries Advisory Council (SFAC), which would advise the Minister in matters dealing with marine resources. The SFAC consisted of members with expertise, representing the various interest groups of the industry (e.g., scientists, industry leaders, and conservationists). The SFAC was in turn assisted by the Sea Fisheries Research Institute (SFRI), which was comprised of scientists and research officers in the various sectors of the industry. The SFRI made scientific recommendations to the SFAC, which would use this information in advising the Minister.

The most significant provision of the Act was the creation of a Quota Board whose primary function was the granting of rights of exploitation. Previously, quotas were determined by the Minister, acting on the advice of officials stationed in Cape Town. In 1986, the Diemont Commission evaluated the matter of access rights and suggested that the allocation of quotas be entrusted to an independent statutory board that would be appointed by the Minister. The body was to be presided over by a person of judicial background and no member could be employed by the state. This recommendation was adopted through the Sea Fisheries Act of 1988, and the Board became active in 1990.

The Quota Board allocated quotas according to the Minster’s guidelines. On the basis of applications submitted, quotas were distributed to parties within the different branches of the fishing industry. By controlling these rights of access, the Quota Board was successful in decreasing the amount of foreign activity in South African waters.

The new government’s plans for transformation of the industry

As a result of the apartheid government and discriminatory practices, the rights to marine resources prior to the 1994 elections were concentrated solely in the hands of white-owned commercial enterprises. Small and medium-sized companies became increasingly disempowered, and more and more employees were forced to move from small- to large-scale enterprises.

Moreover, the poor and subsistence fishermen (mostly non-white) were completely ignored by legislation and government. Coastal communities were denied access to the resources in their own backyard, resources that would alleviate both poverty and hunger. Economic needs were dismissed as the benefits of fishing were funneled away from local populations to the commercial sector and members of disadvantaged groups were denied credit to invest in necessary equipment. Prior to 1994, very few South Africans could benefit from the fishing industry.

With the installation of a new government in 1994 came the promise of a democratic South Africa and the redistribution of resources in all economic sectors including the fishing industry. To redress the wrongdoings of the past, committees were formed and working papers were developed. In 1994, the government formed the Fisheries Policy Development Committee, which was given the task of collecting information for the formulation of new fisheries legislation. The FPDC asked various stakeholders for their input on how marine resources should be managed. The information was compiled and used in 1997 to write a White Paper on Marine Policy, which laid the foundation for the Marine Living Resources Act of 1998, the legislation that was subsequently enacted.

Access

The new government acknowledged that monitoring rights of exploitation, limiting access, and receiving revenues from quotas/license holders was necessary to ensure sustainability of the resource and finance the administration of its management. However, the government also recognized that these measures had been abused in the past and the existing system for granting right of access to marine resources was not a fair and equitable process. The previous system (the Quota Board) was heavily weighted in favor of the large-scale commercial enterprises, and created a privileged elite who alone benefited from the resource. There was nothing in the system for the subsistence fishermen and limited recognition of the needs of small-scale operators.

The FPDC identified the need to develop a mechanism that ensures fair allocation of rights and greater access to resources. A preliminary measure would be to restructure or completely dissolve the Quota Board. The Board was initially established to remove quota decisions from the political arena, thus decreasing the potential for nepotism and corruption. However, the "independent" Quota Board was in fact a complete failure. First it consumed scarce human and financial resources and added to the bureaucracy. Second, the Board remained subject to political pressure and the temptation of corruption. The FPDC suggested that the Board be dismissed and the Minister reinstated with the responsibility for allocating quotas. The Minister, unlike the Board, is an accountable political figure, and although he could seek advice from appropriate committees, he should have the ultimate decision-making power and accountability.

A long term proposal by the FPDC included creating a system that would enable fishermen to purchase valuable long-term rights as opposed to annual quotas. These rights could be obtained through a competitive bidding process, designed to ensure transparency and fairness. It would be especially important in improving the position of small-scale operators. "Real" rights (i.e., long-term assets that are transferable, inheritable, and divisible), would strengthen the small-scale operators’ bargaining power and their ability to negotiate with fish-processing companies. These rights would still be limited by traditional regulatory measures such as TACs, closed seasons, gear specifications, etc.

Research

Research was identified by the FPDC as a key component of effectively changing and improving policy. A previous problem was that there were not many interactions between marine researchers and those who formulated policy. Often, projects concentrated on the scientific aspects and failed to incorporate socio-economic factors. The new government planned to use research to provide the knowledge base for its policy, using multi-disciplinary inputs to cover both the scientific and socio-economic aspects. Examples from other nations have shown that educative research can significantly contribute to policy formation.

The FPDC also recognized research to be an effective tool for efficient management. Given the various stakeholders associated with the industry, there are inevitably conflicting perspectives and differences of opinion. Research can, at least in theory, reduce these differences by providing information and establishing a common ground for all. In order to achieve this, however, considerable time and resources must be allocated to researchers for the fruits of their research to be disseminated to the different sectors of the industry (management, industry leaders, communities, etc.).

Research is important in educating the general public and raising environmental awareness. This goal can be achieved by popularizing research through natural history museums and aquariums, or publishing findings in widely distributed journals and mass-circulated publications. The Sea Fisheries Research Institute could not do this alone; therefore coordination between the various research institutions of South Africa was a necessary step. FPDC recognized that seminars and forums are an effective means to improve coordination and the exchange of ideas and information. The Committee suggested that the SFRI continue to interact with the Consultative Advisory Forum ("CAF"), but also build upon such forums as the one it maintains with Industry Sea-Fisheries ("INSEF"), which provides the opportunity for exchanging scientific information on how to manage marine resources. Forums with various other industry stakeholders, such as unions, research centers, small-scale operators, and local fishermen, would be an effective means of broadening the process.

Another major benefit of research is that it isolates sector areas that can be further developed (e.g. mariculture, underutilized resources, and necessary infrastructure). Efforts should also be taken to incorporate traditional knowledge and local insights into research findings. Looking at the past can play an important role in identifying channels for progress in the future.

Industry restructuring

The new government recognized that simply broadening access and funding research would not be enough to reform the system. A fundamental change of the structure of the industry would be necessary to bring about reform.

Amidst the excitement of the political change, many expected that there would be several major new entrants into the industry. The FPDC concluded that this could not happen since most marine resources were already being harvested at maximum-sustainable levels. The new government realized that redistribution and empowerment would have to occur without destruction of the resources or destabilization of the industry. From the outset, therefore, there were strongly conflicting aims and objectives.

One recommendation of the FPDC was that current quota-holders should restructure their ownership to achieve empowerment. Large companies should sell a significant portion of their equity to previously disadvantaged groups, giving the opportunity for a wider range of players to benefit from the system.

Another was the creation of a Commercial Public Company, which would purchase quotas from the state and rent them to small and medium-sized companies. The FPDC recognized the need to promote small and medium enterprises, and the CPC would be an instrument to do so. This company would not be entitled to catch fish directly, but rather to lease rights to companies for a negotiated price.

The transformation process would also be aided by a limited number of short-term quotas set aside for new entrants. Those applicants who have been historically disadvantaged and have the capacity to harvest the given resource would be granted rights of exploitation. Allowances would be made for those previously advantaged companies who have made significant strides towards transforming their structure (e.g., transferred equity to the previously disadvantaged and changed the composition of their management), not simply adding token individuals but recruiting qualified personnel.

The New Government recognized that the long-term social and economic benefits of marine resources could only be realized through sustainable utilization and resource management. The FPDC recommended that appropriate operational programs be created. These would incorporate cost-effective measures that maximize objectives (sustainability, greater benefit) through minimal input (financial resources). New management plans should include traditional regulatory measures (fishing seasons, gear specifications, marine reserves) but also take into account previously neglected factors such as public participation and local needs. For example, the marine reserves that were established under the old government did not take into account socio-economic factors but were based solely on conservation conservatism. Therefore, those who were in the most need of the resource were often separated from the resource itself. The new government realized that future management policy needs to take into account not only conservation principles, but also the perspectives and needs of the local people.

The new government also planned to integrate marine reserves into a centralized planned network. This would aid in efficient and coordinated management of the areas. Steps to rationalize this system had begun through the establishment of a Marine Reserve Task Group under the auspices of SANCOR (South African Network for Coastal and Oceanographic Research). Government plans would also include involving local communities in the designation of new protected areas, the adjustment of present boundaries, and the development of future management plans.

Integrated environmental management ("IEM") is another principle brought by the new government to management of the fishing industry. Management strategies in the past focused solely on a particular species, in isolation from its impact on other species. FPDC recognized that there is an interaction between different species within a given ecosystem; management strategies must be set accordingly.

Enforcement

Any government policy is ineffective unless it is enforced. This was a fundamental problem with previous fisheries legislation; there was a shortage of human and financial resources and thus no capacity for ensuring compliance. The lack of coordination among government departments, a poor environmental ethic amongst resource users, and inappropriate penalties for infringements aggravated the situation.

The new government suggested that a Monitoring, Control, and Surveillance Unit be established within the fisheries management. This unit, aided by the Navy, Coastal Patrol, and Department of Environmental Affairs, would be responsible for monitoring industry practices and activities. Enforcement and surveillance, however, are costly procedures, and of little use unless behavior is modified. The FPDC concluded that policing alone would not remedy the problem. Education and public awareness of resource conservation, as well as industry and public participation in decision-making, are necessary to promote compliance.

For open-sea monitoring, the FPDC suggested the use of VMS or vessel monitoring systems. VMS uses satellite communication to monitor the vessel’s activities and location. This system could be vital in many valuable sectors of the industry, including the deep-sea and long-line sectors. This system would also be key in monitoring foreign vessels. Previously, foreign vessels that operated in and out of South African waters did so without any sort of surveillance. The new government proposed that all foreign fleets that obtained quotas would be required to install a tracking unit on their vessels so that VMS could monitor their activities.

Government structures

After the election, the government identified numerous flaws impeding the progress of fisheries management. First, the governmental structures created under the apartheid regime were inefficiently administered. This was aggravated by the competition for funds within national departments, and within provincial environmental departments. An increase in political will throughout the departments and an increase in commitment at the higher levels of government were needed in order to improve efficiency and equity.

Second, there was a fragmentation of power due to the various institutions that shared responsibility for fisheries management including the Department of Environmental Affairs, the Department of Trade and Industry, and the Department of Sports and Recreation. Improved coordination was needed to achieve a central mission and goal.

A clarification of roles and responsibilities was also required. Within the government departments, bodies and institutions were given responsibility both to implement conservation measures, and to promote exploitation activities. This presented serious conflicts of interest. One way to resolve this problem would be creating independent inspectorates and/or national norms in order to establish a standard in policy and measure of control over the departments. It is still critical, however, to clarify the roles of different environmental agencies to address this conflict. Additionally there was a drain of expertise from government during the ‘rationalization process’. As a result, the departments were suffering from a grave shortage of qualified personnel. Establishment of training programs was essential to fill in these voids.

Government departments also have a tendency to keep their functions isolated from other spheres of influence by operating in a quasi-secretive manner. This impedes efforts to integrate socio-economic factors and environmental considerations across the various sectors of the industry. It also fosters a growing mistrust on the side of the public. Transparency and access to information needed to be achieved if policy decisions were to be legitimized. The FPDC suggested that state-funded research agencies should publish their findings; that policy deliberations concerning fisheries management decisions should be transparent; that departments and ministers should be held accountable through public hearings; and that applications for allocations should be made available for public scrutiny. A structured mechanism where all stakeholders could give their input on policy formation was also needed.

The new government maintained that marine resources were an exclusive national competence, but many aspects of management could not be administered without coordination and communication with the other levels of government. Therefore, each level was to be given its own respective responsibility:

National: The Department of Environmental Affairs was to be responsible for playing a proactive role in promoting global, regional, and national cooperation regarding fisheries management. It would be vested with the power to formulate and review policy, taking into account socio-economic factors, biodiversity considerations, and cross-sectoral strategies. The Department would be charged with strengthening communication among the various institutions of government and stakeholders of the industry (non-governmental organizations, communities, the private sector, the scientific community, and private individuals).

Provincial: The provincial government was responsible for enacting policies that are locally applicable and in accordance with national objectives. The provinces play a significant role in the actual execution of policies, therefore their advice should be heeded. Many regional departments are limited in both financial and human resources; thus additional funds and training must be provided. Provincial government is also the primary administrator of nature conservation policies (including those for marine reserves); hence it is their responsibility to ensure effective management and a widely representative protection system.

Local: The lowest tier of government would have the responsibility for the implementation of policy and enforcement activities. This is an especially difficult task given the minimal capacity, infrastructure, and resources of local government in many parts of the country. Nevertheless, it is local government’s responsibility to ensure that sustainable considerations are integrated into local strategies. The government is also charged with instituting public education programs, increasing awareness, and developing management plans for local resources under pressure.

The policy reviews discussed above culminated in the enactment of major new legislation to transform the fishing industry in 1998. The Marine Living Resources Act was a significant departure from past legislation, recognizing the comprehensive approach needed for fisheries management. In presentation of the Act, then Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Dr. Z. Pallo Jordan stated:

All natural marine living resources of South Africa, as well as the environment in which they exist, are a national heritage of all South Africa’s people, which should be managed and developed for the benefit of present and future generations.

This statement reflects the two major objectives of the Act, which are the sustainable use of marine living resources and the broadening of access to those resources.

The process of formulating and enacting this legislation took four years (1994-1998). The activities of those four years included the development of the Fisheries Policy Development Committee, the establishment of forums for stakeholders to exchange ideas, and the publishing of papers addressing the issues. Following publication of a Green Paper in 1995, a White Paper on Marine Policy in 1996, and a White Paper on Biodiversity (which dealt with, in part, management of marine resources) in 1997, the framework for the act was created and a bill was introduced in March of 1998. The contents of the bill were discussed in Parliament and the Portfolio Committee on the Environment was given the responsibility to field and incorporate comments and criticism from the various stakeholders in the industry. Given the appropriate changes made, the bill was passed by Parliament on the 21^st of May 1998, and came into effect on September 1^st, 1998.

The act sets forth ten objectives and principles. It identifies the need to promote sustainable utilization of resources while achieving economic growth, to protect the entire ecosystem with due consideration for marine biodiversity, to achieve broad and accountable participation in relevant decision-making, and to "restructure the fishing industry to address historical imbalances and achieve equity within all branches of the fishing industry."

The act is applicable to all persons (South African or not) and all fishing vessels (local or foreign) carrying out fishing activities in South African waters (the EFZ of 200 nautical miles). It also states that the Marine Living Resources Act shall prevail over any provision of other acts (previous or current) that deals with marine resources.

Consultative Advisory Forum

The Consultative Advisory Forum, ("CAF") was established to advise the Minister on matters regarding the management of marine resources and the development of the industry. The forum must be composed of at least five members (there are currently seventeen), who represent the various sectors of the fishing industry. The forum is responsible for advising in several areas, including determining the total allowable catch, modification of fishing regulations, recommending research topics, and allocating money from the Marine Living Resources Fund.

Register

The Act states that the Director General shall keep a register of all persons who have a right of access, other right, permit, and license (this includes recreational and subsistence fishermen who were traditionally excluded). This list must be made available to the public upon request. All persons who seek to exploit a regulated resource must obtain a permit and have that permit available for inspection upon inquiry.

The Minister

The responsibility of managing marine living resources is ultimately vested in the Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism. The Minister determines the TAC, the total applied effort, and the quota allocation (portion of TAC) to subsistence, recreational, commercial, and foreign sectors. The Minister is also charged with suspending any or all fishing activities if an emergency arises that may endanger the viability of stocks or species of marine life. Upon reviewing applications, the Minister may determine who is given access in the quota-controlled fisheries (rock lobster, hake, pelagic, and abalone) and who is given permits for controlled effort fisheries (squid and linefish). The Minister may also decide the duration of rights, with a maximum duration of fifteen years. He shall have a ‘particular regard to the need to permit new entrants, particularly those from historically disadvantaged sectors of society;’ as a means of ‘achieving equity’ within the industry.

Subsistence fishing

The act takes a marked step towards progressive management by specifically addressing the needs of the subsistence sector. Historically, this sector has been denied recognition as a legitimate part of the industry. Coastal communities have traditionally utilized intertidal and shallow waters as a source of food and income. However, due to the nature of their activities and the recent demographic changes enlarging the coastal subsistence sector, a clear definition of a "subsistence fisher" is essential to managing the resource successfully. The Marine Living Resource Act sets about to do just that. According to the act, a subsistence fisher is one who catches fish for the purposes of personal or familial consumption. A subsistence fisher may personally engage in the local sale of his catch, but he may not engage in the sale of fish on a commercial basis. The Minister may designate a certain community as a subsistence fishing zone where other forms of fishing are prohibited. Subsistence permits are not transferable unless the Minister approves.

Recreational fishing

Recreational fishing is defined as ‘fishing done for leisure and sport.’ A recreational fisherman is not allowed to sell any of his catch or transfer his permit. He must also abide by the rules set forth for this sector, including the TAC, minimum size, closed seasons, and legal areas of operation.

Commercial fishing

Commercial fishing is defined as fishing for any species determined by the Minister to be subject to regulation as a commercial fishing. Rights are bought from the Department, with the cost of the permit depending on the species of the fish and specific type of fishing activity. The money goes in part to the Marine Living Resource Fund, and in part to the central government’s National Revenue Fund. Commercial fishing rights may be ‘leased, divided, or otherwise transferred’ upon approval of the Minister. The sector is subject to all regulatory measures including total allowable catch and total allowable effort.

Fisheries Transformation Council

The act established the Fisheries Transformation Council ("FTC") to assist in restructuring the industry to address historical inequities. The primary function of the Council is to ‘facilitate fair and equitable access to rights.’ Although its function is intended to be only temporary -- until previously disadvantaged companies are successfully able to compete -- its role is essential to achieving the objectives of the act. The Council is composed of seven members, appointed by the Minister and broadly representative of the various sectors of the industry. However, no person with a direct interest in the commercial fishing sector may be part of the Council. The FTC is responsible for leasing rights to the previously disadvantaged sectors of the industry and to small scale/medium sized enterprises. The Council is also responsible for deciding how much previously disadvantaged fishers must pay for their rights, taking into account that they cannot afford a high price. All of these functions of the Council are obviously important to the successful transformation of the industry; that is, the broadening of access to a wider range of South Africans and creating a dynamic industry that is not solely dominated by the large-scale commercial sector.

Foreign and high seas fishing

The act states that any international agreement entered into by the South African government concerning access to fish shall not exceed the total allowable catch for the appropriate sector. All foreign vessels are required to obtain a license to fish in South African waters, and must abide by South African legislation and regulations when fishing in South African waters.

All South Africans who wish to fish in the high seas (i.e., outside the country’s territorial waters) must obtain a high seas fishing permit, which is valid for a maximum of one year. High seas fishing must abide by international conservation and management measures such as the dumping of discharge or operating during fish spawning. The act recognizes that the South African government must work with other nations in order to protect this global resource.

Marine protected areas

The Minister is granted power to designate an area is a "marine protected area" in order to protect certain types of marine (animal or plant) life, facilitate management, or diminish conflict between different users. In these reserves, disturbances of any nature that could damage the resources are absolutely prohibited (i.e. fishing, dumping, constructing, dredging, or any other such activity).

Prohibited fishing methods

The act prohibits certain types of fishing methods, such as the use of explosives, poisons, or drift nets (which are large nets that entangle non-target species like marine mammals and sea turtles). The section also enumerates various gear specifications that must be complied with while fishing in South African waters.

Law enforcement

The Director-General of the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism is charged with designating observers and fishery control officers. Observers often ride on a fishing vessel in order to exercise the scientific, compliance, or monitoring measures deemed necessary by the Minister. No one on board, such as captain and crew, must interfere with an observer’s work.

A fishery control officer is responsible for enforcing the provisions of this act. The inspector is allowed to search vessels, vehicles, airplanes, and buildings. He usually needs a warrant to search, but in certain instances (e.g. if he believes a fisher has broken the law), a warrant is not required. All persons must cooperate with officers and if they do not, they can be charged in a court of law.

Judicial matters

The act enumerates various offences and penalties. Anyone not abiding by provisions of the act may be subject to a fine or even prison sentence (varying on the offence). No one is allowed to destroy evidence that may be used in court, or may be incriminating if discovered by a fishery officer. An officer has the right to confiscate any object used or resulting from breaking the law (e.g. boats, cars, airplanes, and fish). The government has the right to sell all confiscated items if the perpetrator is found guilty in a court of law.

General provisions

The minister reserves the right, after consultation with the CAF, to reduce at any given time, the portion of the TAC or TAE allocated to any sector (subsistence, recreational, commercial, or foreign). All rights, permits, and licenses are subject to fees and application for these rights is subject to a fee as well. The act provides for the cancellation or suspension of rights at any time the Minister sees fit.

The act grants the Minster general powers to make rules and regulations regarding marine resources beyond those stated in the act itself. These regulations include, but are not limited to, prescribing operational procedures, establishing guidelines of trade, preventing marine pollution, and protecting specific species. The Minister may also delegate any or all of his power as he deems fit (e.g. charging provincial government to enforce sections of the act, delegating management projects to research centers)—except the power to make regulations.

Appeals to the Minister and the granting of exemptions

Any person affected by the act can ask the Minister to reconsider a decision. After hearing all sides of the case, the Minister must make a final decision.

Given sound and valid reasons, the Minister is also allowed to exempt persons or groups from provisions of the act. However, any exemption granted can be cancelled or amended at any time by the Minister.

Repeals

Except for the exclusion of five sections, all parts of the Sea Fisheries Act of 1988 are repealed by the Marine Living Resources Act of 1998. The sections that remain are those regarding the levy on fish and fish products (section 29), the control over collection and removal of aquatic plants and shells (section 38), offences and penalties (section 47), forfeiture and seizure (section 48), and jurisdiction and evidence (section 50).

This paper has examined the background of the industry: historical legislation, the new government’s plans for transformation, and the culmination of these efforts in Marine Living Resources Act of 1998. Has the targeted transformation taken place? What is the situation of the fishing industry in South Africa today? This paper continues by attempting to answer these questions by analyzing recent information including newspaper and journal articles, and interviewing key stakeholders to gain their perspective on the transformation. It concludes with a case study of the abalone of the Western Cape designed to evaluate the transformational process in one particular sector of the industry.

Sector-specific transformation

The traditional deep sea trawling sector has been steadily reduced since the enactment of the MLRA, in order to increase quotas to new entrants and long-line fishermen. In 1999, the deep sea TAC was cut by 5%, this 5% resulting primarily from a 10% reduction in quotas for each of the five traditional operators. Another 50 operators, mostly new entrants, had their quotas increase by 20%. Although this appears to be a step in the right direction, many of these new entrants lack the equipment and expertise to actually catch their given quota. Many are yet to even show any intent of a doing so.

Although this attempted shift from trawling to long-line fishing may be a progressive management measure (long-line is less capital-intensive than trawling due to the difference in equipment), unfortunately it is creating more conflict within the sector. The cause is actually rooted in government’s redistribution of the quotas. In 1998, 75 hake long-line applicants were distributed quotas of around 75 tons each. In 1999, due to a cut in hake for the deep-sea trawler sector, this average was increased to around 150 tons however it was made available to only 48 applicants. Why did the government reduce by 27 the number of participants in this sector when it is supposed to be broadening access? Another point of contention is the total allowable catch; the combined TAC for hake in the deep-sea trawling and long-line sectors has remained roughly the same for the past few years. Although this may appear to be a result of effective scientific surveys and management, it actually seems to be more a result of a ‘paralyzed central government.’ The government, provided in the MLRA, is supposed to be working towards optimal sustainable utilization of the resources to achieve economic growth. But the new management regime has not been able to increase availability of the resource. The TAC for hake is still at only 50% of its 1960 level.

Linefish

The linefish sector of the South African fishing industry is facing a serious crisis. Management measures under the new government have not achieved their goal. The list of species on the endangered list in this sector has actually risen from eleven to twenty. There has been an absolute mismanagement of the stock and disregard for species sustainability by the resource users. Almost all of the species of the family Sparidae (this family includes such South African indigenous fish as red roman, red and white steenbras, and stumpnose) are facing the possibility of extinction. The Sparidae are unique in that they are a transgender species; that is they begin as male, and then mature into females. Consequently, fishermen who target the large-sized fish are simultaneously wiping out the females of the species and jeopardizing future reproduction. Yet exploitation continues, primarily due to greed and ignorance of the species’ life history.

Very recently, it was announced that snoek, the last remaining unregulated linefish species for subsistence fishermen, might also join the other species on the endangered list. Historically, there have been no regulations on this staple fish, given its abundance in the water. However, due to this oversight in management, the viability of the snoek stock is now being threatened. A catch limit on this fish will have serious repercussions on thousands of subsistence fishers in the Western Cape who depend on snoek for their livelihood. Although the snoek stock is subject to fluctuations due to environmental factors, it is believed that fishing practices have been the most significant cause of its decline. For example, now that all the other staple fish have been placed on the endangered list (e.g. steenbras and kob), fishermen have been increasingly targeting snoek, adding to the pressure on the stock. However, it is not the subsistence fishermen, but the commercial fishermen who are the most responsible for snoek’s dramatic decline. Commercial fishermen have the capacity to take thousands of fish at a time, and they often use non-discriminatory methods that target both legal and undersized fish. Unfortunately, those that will be most affected by heightened regulations are the artisanal (define) and subsistence fishermen, not the commercial. As before the new government took office, the commercial sector is still a dominating force in the industry and changes within the sector appear virtually impossible. Government efforts to date have been inadequate and ineffective.

Pelagic and purse-seine fishing

The pelagic sector has experienced various problems since the enactment of the Marine Living Resources Act. During the first year of the act, there were questions regarding quota allocations; hence the pelagic sector’s 1998 season was delayed by two months. As a result, 70 000 tons of anchovy were not achieved, amounting to a 40 million rand loss to the sector. Coincidentally, the quota allocations for 1999 were late as well. This delay, coupled with the decline in the international price for processed pelagic fish, has amounted to a R65 million loss to the sector this year. The industry is still trying to overcome these financial losses as well as grapple with the global oversupply of canned fish. Unfortunately, the sector that has been hit the hardest is the small- and medium-sized enterprises. Although SMME’s own forty-four percent of all pelagic rights, they do not have the capital to survive these delays. Ironically, this is the sector that the new government specifically targeted for assistance; yet its actions — or rather its inactions — are doing just the opposite.

On a positive note, the total allowable catch for the sector has been relatively stable, and will probably remain so for the next couple of years. The sardine catch is showing a slight decrease in recruitment and biomass than last year, but the catch on the whole is higher than previous years. Anchovy is showing an increase in growth and recruitment, so the fishery may be able to catch its entire anchovy TAC of 236 000 tons this season (it only caught 70% of last year’s TAC due to the late announcement of quotas). Round herring, a non-quota species in the pelagic sector, is showing a considerable increase so the TAC may be raised from last year. One problem that may arise with the possible increase of sardine and round herring is the issue of by-catch. Anchovy, sardine, and round herring are all caught with the same net; anchovy being the target species with sardine and herring forming the by-catch. According to provisions in the MLRA, if the by-catch exceeds 10% of the total catch, all fishing activities must cease. This may pose a problem in achieving the anchovy TAC and/or lead to an increase in dumping of unwanted species. Research is currently being done to improve equipment and management strategies in this sector.

An issue that has come up within all sectors of the industry, but was recently highlighted in the pelagic, is the frustrating and costly processing of quota applications. Fishing communities ranging from the Western Cape to the Eastern Cape are threatening legal action against the government unless they receive some sort of retribution. Last year, several disadvantaged communities filled out applications for quotas in the pelagic sector, spending up to 3000 rand on consultant fees for each application. These communities did not receive quotas and upon asking why, were told the sector was already over-saturated. If that was in fact the case, why did government accept applications and allow communities to waste their money if they knew at the outset that no new quotas would be granted? To aggravate the situation, companies whom the FTC recommended should not receive quotas (due to incomplete applications, lack of capacity, or inadequate business plans) did in fact receive them. Which qualifications are being used to grant quotas? After examining the industry, this question still remains unanswered.

Squid

The squid fishery has recently been the subject of great concern. Many believe that the transformation has not in fact taken place and that the same elite circle of companies and individuals still dominate the industry. Others, namely members of the squid fishermen’s association (SASMIA) disagree. For the second consecutive season, squid permits were cut due to scientist recommendations. It was determined that there has been an increase in effort and fishing activities without an increase in actual catch. Small boats without refrigeration are being replaced by larger iceboats, and technology is improving catch methods. Scientists are thus worried that this increase in CPUE (catch per unit of effort) will pose a threat to resource sustainability. The spokesman for SASMIA stated that many companies have invested heavily in the industry to upgrade their boats to European standards. These huge investments (beginning at R3.5 million for an 18m boat) are still being paid off and the recent cut in permits is not going to facilitate payment. The new government recommended that capital investment be made in new technologies; yet companies are being penalized for their efforts to do exactly that.

Despite the decrease in permits, there is little evidence that a decrease in efforts has actually taken place. In fact, cutting permits has only aggravated the situation by "forcing fishermen to break the law," as the SASMIA spokesman stated. Given this 30-60% cut, small boats are no longer economically viable; therefore, they are forced "to go to sea with more men than they have licenses for." There is a lack of enforcement on the part of MCM, so many vessels are succeeding in operating with more than the maximum number of crew allowed. This increase in effort per permit is countering any effect of a decrease in the number of permits.

Squid fishermen are calling for alternative means of decreasing the fishing effort in the sector. Options include increasing the length of the closed season, prohibiting operation in certain areas, and modifying boat licensing. As of now, licenses are issued per individual instead of per boat, making the calculation of the actual fishing effort very difficult. SASMIA believes that licenses should be issued per boat so that efforts can be better accounted for and policy can be adjusted accordingly. The resource itself is subject to high fluctuations. The predicting stock assessment for each season is quite complicated as well. Scientists have installed a permanent mooring near jigging areas to investigate factors that influence squid spawning (which is the time when jigging boats primarily operate). Hopefully this information will lead to explanations for these fluctuations and improved management strategies.

Rock lobster

The rock lobster fishery is facing difficulties at the moment. The resource as a whole (both the South Coast and West Coast species) is experiencing a downward trend. The South Coast catch has been relatively stable at around 500 tons, but there have been conflicting data regarding where exactly the resource is on the exploitation curve. Although management strategies are reacting to the new data, it is thought that compliance at sea and heightened control at landing points is all that is needed to keep the resource stable. Unfortunately, management strategies for the West Coast lobster are not as simple. The resource is experiencing a decrease in somatic growth, meaning there is a higher proportion of smaller lobsters. These changes, coupled with an increase in utilization, are causing the resource to be on the brink of collapse. Since poachers have targeted the last area where the lobsters are still high in biomass (Cape Point to Cape Agulhas), the viability of the resource does not look promising.

South Africans unhappy with the low harvest of the local rock lobster resource have now turned towards international poaching. Tristan de Cunha, an island 2800 km off of Cape Town, has recently expressed its anger towards South Africa’s illegal exploitation of their resource. The island has a population of only 300 people, and the rock lobster is the primary source of livelihood. Although evidence is limited to anecdotal events (commercial pilots spotting activities or individual reports from Cape Town), the island has decided to heighten measures to curb rock lobster poaching. The British Royal Navy has agreed to assist in monitoring by conducting regular patrols and installing new radar. Poaching by South Africans stands to not only damage their own economy and ecosystem, but those of another country as well.

Another problem plaguing both this and other sectors of the industry is the situation of "paper" quotas. That is to say, quotas are issued on paper to new entrants, who merely sell their paper rights to established commercial companies. At first glance, the quota distribution of 1997/8 season would appear to suggest that the West Coast rock lobster fishery had achieved a certain level of transformation. In 1988, the fishery had a total of 38 quota holders, with Oceana dominating the group by holding 1400 tons of the 4000 tons allocated (35% of the total allowable catch). For the 1997/8 season, there were 75 quota holders listed, Oceana not being one of them. Although it may seem that this sector has broadened access and successfully transformed its structure, this is in fact not the case. Although Oceana is no longer listed as a quota holder, or even listed in parentheses next to subsidiary companies, it still answers on behalf for many of the companies listed on the quota list. (source?)

As discussed later in this paper, new entrants, represented by black empowerment leaders and anti-apartheid activists, are receiving the lion’s share of the rock lobster quota. However, few actually have or are willing to invest in the capacity to achieve these quotas. Essentially, they are selling their allocation back to the established companies of the industry (e.g. Oceana, or Premier). The South Coast Rock Lobster Association has voiced a similar complaint in that its members have surrendered 10% of their TAC to new entrants, only to buy these tons back at a later time. New entrants are not using their rights to invest in disadvantaged communities but rather selling them back to the same big companies, and walking away with an easy profit. (in other words, benefits are not being redistributed to those who are actually in the fishing industry. Hence there are no returns, i.e. new employment opportunities, participation in local resource management, to the very communities that need help).

Stakeholder transformation

There has been considerable progress in regards to the subsistence sector since the enactment of the Marine Living Resources Act. The sector has moved from obscurity to recognition; however, there are several issues that still need to be addressed. First, the definition of "subsistence fishermen" in the MLRA is inadequate in that it provides for dietary needs but does not provide the fishermen with any means of income. Subsistence fishermen (the people who would fall under this definition, or those whom the government is trying to describe?) are often uneducated and unskilled in areas outside fishing. Although some find employment at local processing plants, the work is only seasonal, and there is a high unemployment rate among coastal communities (around 30%). Secondly, many marine resources are not suitable for subsistence use, either due to their lucrative value (e.g. abalone and rock lobster), the high level of technology required, or an endangered status. Resources must be classified by their suitability for each sector, especially for the subsistence.

The Subsistence Fishers Task Group is currently addressing these as well as numerous other issues facing the subsistence sector. Appointed by the Chief Director of Marine and Coastal Management in 1998, SFTG has been a means of incorporating subsistence fishing ideals into government management. For the past two years, the group has visited communities along the coast, consulting fishermen and running workshops in order to develop a new subsistence management system. The final report was recently submitted, in which the group identified the system it wishes to see in place. Provisions include (1) new definitions and criteria for subsistence fishing that provide ‘specific grounds for practical and legal implementation’ (2) new criteria and definitions of commercial fishing that encompass the development of small-scale commercial fishermen (3) classification of resources based on suitability for subsistence, recreational, small scale, and large commercial use (4) and a new management structure that includes a separate subsistence unit within MCM and several regional bodies. The report has received a favorable response from government, and it is likely that many of its recommendations (particularly that for a specific subsistence management unit) will be implemented by the end of 2000.

Small-scale and medium-sized enterprises

Small-scale and medium-sized enterprises, or SMEs, are a sector of the fishing industry that the new government specifically targeted for assistance. As stated in the White Paper on Marine Policy, "the promotion of small and medium sized enterprises within the context of creating a globally competitive industry is crucial." However, despite these intentions of restructuring the industry through promoting SMEs and empowering formerly disadvantaged black groups, there has been little actual transformation of the sector.

The new government charged the large-scale commercial sector with encouraging the development of SMEs. Strategies include expanding equity, allowing a larger proportion of quotas to be sold to small-scale operators, establishing contracts for co-operatives, and helping SMEs to improve efficiency. The majority of these recommendations are yet to be realized or even attempted. Although companies recognize the need for aid to SMME’s, few are prepared to provide it and unfortunately, few SMEs are willing to even try. As discussed later in the paper, many new entrants are taking advantage of the system by through "paper" quotas and "joint ventures." Instead of creating new jobs, restructuring the industry, and investing in communities, SMEs are taking their allocated quotas and simply selling them back to the traditional large-scale companies. Industry transformation has in fact been minimal.

There are a few SMEs, however, who have taken an active role in the industry, such as the Gugulethu Fishing Company. This SMME is a black-owned fishing group comprised of eight businesses from Cape Town townships. There has been a huge investment in the group, and to date it has created 50 new jobs. Another exemplary SMME is the South African Commercial Fisherman’s Corporation ("SACFC"). Formed in 1998 under the guidelines of then Minister Pallo Jordan, the body consists of 25 co-operatives and 3000 members ranging from Doring Bay to Jeffrey’s Bay. The corporation has received quotas for West Coast rock lobster, abalone, squid, and longline hake, which are divided between the co-ops on a pro-rata basis. The corporation has invested R 5 million in the industry (boats, equipment, factories, and trucks), created 46 permanent jobs, and is currently working on establishing a training facility and development officer to assist in capacity building for its member co-operatives.

A major problem facing small- and medium-sized enterprises is the delay in quota allocations. These problems have already been touched upon in the pelagic section of this paper, although the situation is especially serious with the longline fishery. The longline hake sector is one of the few segments of the industry in which SMEs appear to have a possibility of success. Longline does not require the capital-intensive investments that deep-sea trawling does, and fresh hake commands a very high price on the international market. Unfortunately, due to FTC reviews and court interdicts, all activities in the hake longline sector have been halted for 8 months, as of April 2000. Hake longline applicants have submitted their applications for 2000 before knowing if they have even received their 1999 quotas. This delay is causing immense financial distress to the SMEs, who do not have the capital to survive without actually catching fish.

A group has recently been formed to provide a voice to SMEs. The South Africa Fishing Forum was founded in November of 1999 to act as a lobbying group for SMEs and assist in their development. As the chief executive officer stated, "we want small operators to go beyond "paper" quotas and play an active role in the industry." The forum is attempting to open lines of communication with the government (especially regarding hake longline) to stimulate growth and transformation. A summit has been called to discuss future policy, management plans, long-term rights, and the establishment of a verification unit to ensures that quota holders are following the initiative of industry transformation.

Unions

Historically, unions have been on the fringe of the industry; excluded from decision-making and environmental management. Recently though, unions are taking a more active role within the industry by engaging in government forums, obtaining executive positions within organizations, and exchanging ideas with commercial management. Unions have begun working towards progressive participation and have become active in representing fishing management (i.e. ship captains), recruiting workers, pushing minimum labor standards, and establishing guidelines for safety.

Despite these significant changes within this sector, the situation of unions and workers has basically remained the same. Unions are still marginalized from the rest of the industry and they have not significantly benefited from the transformation. The same people are advising the important government bodies, the same big companies are dominating the industry, and the same workers are still being excluded from the decision-making process. There is an absence of union participation in the issues that affect workers the most. Unions have also been marginalized from the other stakeholders in the industry such as scientists, research centers, SMEs, and coastal communities. There is a misconception that unions and workers are not interested in environmental management and conservation strategies. For example, one research officer stated that they do not interact with unions for "they would not want to know our opinion." On the contrary, unions have a definite desire to heighten environmental consciousness and achieve sustainable management of resources for it is in their best interest as well; without fish, they lose employment. A long-term proposal by one union is a federation of fishermen which stretches across all fishery sectors and incorporates the various stakeholders in the industry. However, neither this federation nor actual transformation can ever take place within the sector unless the established industry participants lose some power and the government achieves greater transparency.

Foreign vessels and international agreements

As cane be seen from the foregoing, South Africa’s marine living resources are not adequately managed to sustain the pressures put upon them by South African nationals. Thus it becomes all the more important to limit the use of these resources to foreign players. But despite progressive developments regarding international agreements and monitoring of foreign vessels, the new government is leaning towards a replay of the environmental and financial disasters of the 1970s. During the beginning of this year, an influential fishing company named Velamar entered into negotiations with the Spanish company Freiremar. These negotiations are cause for alarm since Spain has a long and notorious history of over-exploitation and disregard for regulations. For example, its operations in Argentina have caused the complete collapse of the hake resource, and its activities in North Africa have decimated the octopus and squid resources of the area. Although government policy has traditionally prohibited Spain from operating in South African waters, the profits from this venture seem to be dictating policy (a potential net profit of 132 million rand). There are also many influential shareholders that have interest in Velamar, perhaps explaining last season’s acceptance of a very late quota application.

The traditional South African companies are perplexed, because Velamar, a new entrant to the industry, asked for the same amount of hake that the established companies receive. Although Velamar’s hake quota was denied, this was a very bold move by the company, given that the TAC for hake has not increased for many years. It remains to be seen what the government decides to do for next season, and the industry is closely monitoring the situation.

Some are already wary of this venture, as shown by fishermen’s protest outside the Spanish Embassy in February of this year. This peaceful march demanded that President Mbeki intervene and investigate the quota-granting process. Although Velamar promises that its joint venture will benefit both disadvantaged communities and small-scale enterprises, international examples have proved otherwise. Globalization typical results in the concentration of capital in the hands of a few large companies. This joint venture could result in a foreign interest wresting control from South Africa’s hands; a few South Africans could end up as economic beneficiaries without exercising any management control over an unscrupulous foreign partner.

Research

There have been significant strides in marine research towards achieving the recommendations of the new government. Various institutions ranging from Rhodes University to the University of the Western Cape have been committed to working with the government in the formation of policy. The Sea Fisheries Research Institute, which was recently replaced by Marine and Coastal Management ("MCM"), is the government body charged with managing marine resources. Within the department are a number of research directorates, dealing with such areas as promoting subsistence fisheries and socio-economic research; creating stock assessment models and species distribution patterns; and exploring other economically viable stocks and sectors of the industry (e.g. mariculture). MCM works in conjunction with other research centers like Marine Resource Assessment and Management ("MARAM") and the Center for Marine Studies ("CMS").

MARAM is a research group at the University of Cape Town that focuses on quantitative studies used for scientific recommendations for management strategies (e.g. TACs). The group is contracted by government (local and foreign) and large commercial companies. Current research projects include creating multi-species models, developing operational management procedures, regulating by-catch species, and assessing highly variable stocks. CMS is another research group at UCT, and is also primarily contracted by government and commercial interests. Projects include evaluating potential mining operations for De Beers, examining the impact of oil pollution for Engen Kalk, and surveying stocks for sectors of the South African fishing industry.

Although marine research has succeeded in playing a role in policy formation, there are several fundamental changes that this area has not achieved. First, research centers such as CMS and MARAM interact with a very limited number of stakeholders; namely government and large commercial companies. Research scientists meet regularly with industry leaders and government officials through such forums as INSEF, but they do not interact with unions, SMEs, or local communities. One problem stated by a research officer is that these other stakeholders do not have the money to contract their work. Although this may be the case, it does not constitute a sufficient reason for developing and presenting scientific knowledge exclusively for the wealthy and established segments of the industry. The FPDC encouraged the dissemination of information to all stakeholders in the industry; this recommendation is yet to be realized.

A second transformation that has not occurred is the incorporation of socio-economic factors and traditional knowledge into research projects. Unfortunately, the work of such groups as MARAM and CMS is in high demand since there are few researchers whose focus is the quantitative and qualitative analysis of marine resources. As an officer of MARAM stated, they simply do not have the manpower to incorporate the various factors stated by the FPDC. It is the responsibility of MCM to address these issues, but government has proven incapable of doing so. As stated earlier in this paper, the Subsistence Fishers Task Group may succeed in establishing a Subsistence Management Unit within the MCM department. If this is done, socio-economic factors of local communities will hopefully be integrated into future research projects.

There are several research institutions already in place that focus on development issues. The International Ocean Institute located at the University of the Western Cape is a group working on capacity-building and improving the livelihoods of poor and underprivileged coastal communities. As of now, their work is centered mainly on seaweed mariculture, but hopefully their projects will expand to include fishing activities and the exploitation of other living marine resources.

VIBES (VIability of exploited pelagic fish resources in the Benguela Ecosystems in relation to the environment and Spatial aspects) and the Benguela Environment Fisheries Interaction and Training Programme ("BENEFIT") are two groups that are working on bilateral capacity-building in the Benguela eco-region. VIBES focuses on training students using international expertise and information. VIBES is currently collaborating with BENEFIT, MCM, UWC, and the French government to develop new tools into regional assessment of pelagic resources in the Benguela system. BENEFIT is a group that involves South Africa, Namibia, and Angola, and focuses on the development of scientific/technical programs integrated with capacity-building. These programs will conduct research on the sustainable development of living marine resources in the Benguela ecosystem. BENEFIT acts as a facilitator for training in marine science and fisheries for all participating countries of the Southern African Development Community ("SADC").

Large commercial fishing

Transformation in the commercial sector has unfortunately been minimal. Although there are a few examples of black empowerment taking place within the industry, the underlying story is that nothing has significantly changed. New entrants and black empowerment groups are faced with labor and capital intensive restrictions that threaten their survival. Additionally, no institutions have been created to address these restrictions on the industry (i.e. establishing training facilities or credit investment companies).

The traditional companies have now evolved into multinational giants that have an enormous amount of wealth and power. These upper areas of the industry have not been transformed simply due this wealth and power. The government may seem to go through the motions of transformation, but in the end, it is the companies and their wealth that dictate the pace of transformation and effect of governmental policy. It is believed that the large-scale commercial enterprises are holding the government at ransom in that the companies have the knowledge to manage the resource and businesses but they are not willing to share it with other stakeholders. The companies can use this knowledge, and the fact that they provide significant employment and foreign exchange earnings, as leverage for obtaining a high percentage of the quotas. The provision of the White Paper that states that the disadvantaged sector can benefit from the industry by purchasing equity in large companies is simply a means to ensure that large companies still control the industry. The large-scale commercial sector is still getting the majority of the pie while everybody else scrambles to pick up the remaining crumbs. Apparent reductions don’t really affect the companies, for they still have the ability to exploit international waters and the opportunity to enter into local "joint ventures."

Government

The government has not set an exemplary precedent for the transformation process. Since the enactment of the MLRA, the department seems to be plagued with inefficiency, inadequacy, and corruption. The very bodies charged with transformation of the fishing industry are, paradoxically, the source of many of its problems.

The first of these bodies is the Fisheries Transformation Council. The FTC, as stated in the MLRA, has responsibility for addressing the inequities and historical imbalances of the industry. They were delegated a very important function -- one which would be key in the transformation process (hence, the title of the body). On 5 March 2000, it was announced in a parliament business plan that the FTC may lose its power to allocate fishing rights to the Department of Trade and Industry. Since the creation of the Council, quota allocations have been chaotic and inefficient, resulting in financial losses for companies, fishermen, and communities. After several long-line hake companies reported bankruptcy due to a delay in 1999 quotas, a court ordered Minister Moosa and the FTC to reconsider and reallocate these quotas. On March 15^th, however, (the day before the deadline) 4 out of the council’s 5 members resigned, allegedly because they had not been paid for the past six months. But an internal audit discovered that members had for a time been paid R400 to R450 an hour when the maximum salary is R87 an hour. The Council was also upset about the possibility of their functions being transferred to the Department of Trade and Industry. The FTC left a considerable amount of work undone when the members resigned; quotas were yet to be allocated for the current season of long-line hake, sardine, anchovy, and patagonian toothfish. Although the members were recently reinstated, the council’s integrity as an administrative body has been compromised.

The Consultative Advisory Forum ("CAF") has been the subject of controversy as well. The CAF assists the Minister in determining the TAC. At the beginning of this year, it was discovered that the CAF’s chairman was a new recipient of hake quota in 1999 and received a quota for the 2000 season as well. The chairman’s company has no boat at the moment, and fished its 1999 quota through a "joint venture" with Marpro. The company is still unsure what it is going to do with the 750 tons for this year and the Chairman is "unaware of any other members of CAF who have also been recently awarded quotas." (cite?) Although the MLRA does not prohibit members of CAF from having a direct interest in the industry, the forum is responsible for proposing changes to fisheries management that benefit the entire industry, not simply their own personal stake. The conflict of interest is obvious.

At the end of last year, an internal investigation into the department of Marine and Coastal Management found numerous irregularities, including a lack of basic financial administrative procedures, unauthorized spending of 24 million rand, and possible corruption. This investigation resulted in the suspension of several senior officers of MCM. In December of 1999, Environmental Affairs Deputy Minister Joyce Mabudafhasi commissioned an investigation into the Department of Environmental Affairs. The final report, which was submitted to President Mbeki and Environmental Affairs Minister Moosa, is reputed to contain evidence of fishing companies illegally paying millions of rands for quotas and ANC senior members committing acts of fraud and nepotism. The report was withheld from public release due its "sensitive nature." Although the investigator’s background is questionable, the Democratic Party has requested that the report be published. Whether the report is published or not, this recent development unfortunately illustrates that the corruption endemic to the fishing industry has possibly penetrated even the highest levels of government.

On a positive note, the cabinet has recently appointed MCM Program Manager Mr. Horst Kleinschmidt as Deputy Director-General. This means that MCM has been elevated to a higher level of priority within the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism. Kleinschmidt is determined to reorganize the management and quota allocation procedures of MCM. He also plans on developing long-term strategies for each species and sector to achieve genuine transformation in the industry. Kleinschmidt also plans on creating a credible committee with extensive guidelines for determining rights allocations. These measures will hopefully eliminate, or at least minimize, the possibilities of bias, manipulation, and litigation from the process.

Quota transformation

With the abolishment of the Quota Board, the enactment of the MLRA, and the new government’s plans to address historical imbalances, one would hope that much has changed in terms of quota allocations. Unfortunately, this is not the case.

Since the enactment of the Act, the quota situation has evolved into a chaotic fiasco. "Protest," "financial loss," "unfair," "arbitrary," and "corruption" are the words that dominate both headlines and conversations. Before examining these charges, one must first look at the system as it stands since the enactment of the MLRA.

The system

On paper, the government has followed many of the FPDC’s suggestions and the provisions of the MLRA. The Minister determines the quotas for each industry (which is a portion of the TAC) upon the advice of the CAF. The CAF is comprised of 18 members, broadly representative of the industry (one from each of the 4 coastal provinces, scientists, sociologists, industry participants, and a lawyer). The FTC consists of 5 members delegated the task of leasing rights to the disadvantaged and small-scale sectors of the industry. The MCM works with the FTC to determine the quota distributions. The MCM reads quota applications and scores them based on various factors, such as intent of transformation, quality of business plan, and environmental assessment. After the top applications are approved by MCM, the FTC has the opportunity to criticize and challenge the selections that were made. Based upon these discussions, the Council formulates its recommendations to the Minister, who then makes the ultimate decision.

Although transparency has seemingly been achieved, there are a number of problems with the system. As stated earlier, there is much controversy surrounding the composition and functions of these administrative bodies. As a result, their credibility as legitimate organs of government has been undermined. There are also questions regarding the transparency between the FTC’s recommendations and the minister’s ultimate decisions. What qualifications are being used to grant quotas? Why are some of the FTC’s recommendations heeded and others not? Once again, these questions remain unanswered.

Another problem with the system is the quota application process. First, although the FTC was supposed to adjust permit fees to the needs of the disadvantaged, the application fee remains high. Most disadvantaged fishermen cannot afford to submit an application, let alone pay a consultant to assist with drafting a business plan. Secondly, the system lacks an effective means of verifying information listed on applications. As a result, companies and individuals have been using token black names on the application form; names of people who are not even part of a company’s registrar are listed simply to get quotas granted. There is even the instance of an individual using the name of a past player in the industry in order to receive quotas. Oddly enough, this man has long been dead, but somehow even dead men manage to receive quotas.

"Paper" quotas and "joint ventures"

Unfortunately, in terms of quotas at the commercial levels of the fishing industry, transformation has only taken place on paper. It is a situation that stakeholders are aware of and recognize as an obstacle to significant restructuring of the industry, yet few stakeholders are actually willing to change. As stated earlier, "paper" quotas are used within every sector of the industry (deep-sea, pelagic, rock lobster etc.) and undermine any prospects for real transformation.

In essence, many empowerment groups and small-scale enterprises, headed by such figures as successful black businessmen and anti-apartheid activists, have shown the intent to enter the industry. Upon promising the creation of jobs, construction of infrastructure, development of disadvantaged communities, and amendment of historical imbalances, these new entrants have been awarded quite handsome quotas. For example, one third of the total TAC for rock lobster was awarded to two men, Johnny Issel and Themba Yundla, and their respective companies. However, these SMEs are not personally selling their quotas, and it is questionable if they even catch them. Companies such as Issel’s and Yundla’s do not have a boat, a crew, or the expertise to catch their allocations. The companies that do sell and catch these quotas are the same companies that have dominated the sector for the past 50 years: Oceana, Lusitania, Sea Harvest, Premier, and Irvin and Johnson. Black groups have been granted quotas under the guise of uplifting the disadvantaged when in fact they are merely selling their fishing rights to the traditional five and pocketing the profit.

Even though they are part of the transaction, the big business interests of the industry have been critical of the situation, since they are having their allocations cut for new entrants and then later having to buy back those same rights. "Empowerment" groups, as middlemen in the quota transfer, get their cut but contribute to economic value. Since these actions are illegal, nobody is willing to name names or jeopardize their operations. For now, the new entrants and the traditional five will continue to operate as "joint ventures," the preferred term to explain why the traditional five answer the phone when one calls these new entrants’ "company number." If these joint ventures do in fact exist, why haven’t new jobs been created, infrastructure constructed, training facilities established, or communities uplifted? A sufficient explanation to these questions is yet to be given.

………………………………………………………………………………………………

Abalone are large marine snails that live in the shallow, intertidal zones of the coast. There are five species endemic to South Africa, but Halitotis midae or perlemoen is the species primarily targeted for exploitation. Abalone are sedentary animals, and are usually found in large groups near or within kelp beds. One of the reasons for abalone’s high concentration in kelp beds is their unique feeding technique. Abalone cannot sustain themselves solely on the seaweed in their immediate vicinity. Therefore, an abalone will often trap an overhanging kelp frond and share it with its neighbors. This energy-efficient way of feeding perhaps explains why abalone tend to stick together. This tendency can also be explained by the abalone’s reproductive nature. Abalone are broadcast spawners, meaning that males and females release their gametes into the water at the same time. A high density while broadcasting increases the chances of fertilization and hence the viability of the stock. Congregating in large, relatively stationary groups in the shallow kelp beds is beneficial for feeding and reproduction, but it also renders the abalone vulnerable to over-exploitation.

Exploitation

While there is evidence of abalone exploitation in South Africa dating back 125 000 years, the abalone commercial fishery did not begin until 1949. The commercial sector operated with no regulations and dominated the fishery until the early 1990s. In 1983, TACs, permits, and quotas were introduced, and after the Marine Living Resources Act abalone exploitation was extended to include recreational and subsistence fishermen as well (these activities did not exist before the MLRA?) Today, exploitation of abalone is controlled through established guidelines for each sector. Commercial fishermen are limited by the TAC and are allowed to operate from a boat using aqualungs. (?) Recreational and subsistence fishermen are only allowed to operate from shore using a snorkel and are limited to 4 abalone per day. Recreational fishermen may only operate during the season and are not allowed to sell their catch while subsistence fishermen may sell their excess catch but not on a commercial basis.

Resource

The abalone resource has been suffering a worldwide crash. In the past ten years, wild abalone has dropped by 30% with the abalone fisheries in California, Canada, Mexico completely collapsing. In South Africa, the TAC for abalone has dropped from 660 tons in 1972 to 515 tons in 1998/9. Although this drop may not seem significant, the collapse of the resource in certain parts of the coast has created both a biological and economic crisis. Currently, the TAC is divided into 8 zones, with the center of activity occurring between Hangklip and Quoin Point. The TAC for Zone C (the area between Hermanus and Hawston) has dropped from 170 tons in 1990 to 5 tons for 1998/99. MCM scientists conducted a dive survey in the area and found that the number of adults had declined from five to one. This decrease is a result of a combination of factors. First of all, there has been a decrease of sea urchins in the area due to the inshore movement of the cape rock lobster. Sea urchins are important to the development of abalone since juveniles find shelter under the sea urchins’ spines. As a result of the rock lobsters eating all the sea urchins, the juvenile abalone have lost their natural shelter and have virtually disappeared from the coast. Another significant factor for the decline in abalone is the increase of illegal activities (poaching).

Poaching of abalone

Since the early 1990s, poaching activities have escalated and have now become the largest threat to the abalone resource. Poaching of abalone is very difficult to control, since it involves complex socio-economic factors, political paralysis, public ignorance, and organized crime. Although it is difficult to quantify the exact impact of poaching on the resource, illegal exploitation has been blamed for the species’ dramatic decline especially in the area between Hemanus and Hangklip (citation?). Poachers do not use discriminatory methods; confiscated stocks often include many juveniles. Recently in Gaansabai, 1900 abalone were confiscated, some only 50 mm in size (the legal size is 114 mm). As one inspector stated, "there is really no respect for the resource anymore." In addition to inadvertently targeting juveniles, the sheer numbers that poachers harvest is a threat in itself. In three months of 2000, poachers had already been caught with the equivalent of the total confiscation from 1999. Although this may seem to be a result of heightened enforcement, this is not the case. Regulation of the resource has actually declined and thus there has been an increase in activity and effort. It is believed that poaching harvests as much as the TAC determined for the commercial sector (around 530 tons). Unless poaching is stopped, the future of the resource is highly doubtful.

Hawston poaching situation

The first area to have felt the detriments of abalone poaching is the community of Hawston. Located 130 kilometers east of Cape Town, this community has been the center of poaching controversy. In 1993, there were violent confrontations between community members and police leading to discussions about the exploitation situation in the area. In 1995, a study led by the Institute of Criminology at the University of Cape Town revealed many of the reasons for the occurrence of poaching both in this area and other coastal communities of the Western Cape (citation?).

The study found that there are several types of poaching, ranging from fishermen exceeding their daily catch to international syndicates with offices in Hong Kong. Abalone is in high demand in the Far East where the species is considered a delicacy and an aphrodisiac. As a result of this insatiable demand and worldwide shortage of supply, syndicates such as the Chinese Triad have targeted South African abalone for exploitation. Triad members have linked up with local poachers, offering them a very high price and exemplary treatment for the coveted species. Triad members have even bought processing rights in South Africa; the catch is harvested through illegal means but processed at legitimate factories.

The study found that the primary reasons for poaching were "need, easy money, and past injustices." (citation?) In circumstances of poverty, environmental considerations are often ignored and abalone are not harvested in a sustainable manner. Given the lucrative nature of abalone, greed also plays a factor in promoting short-term gains over long-term interests. Abalone is relatively easy to access (one only needs a snorkel and a wedge), and the value of the harvest outweighs any potential risk of punishment. Finally, the poachers justify their actions as a reaction to the injustices of the past. During apartheid, coastal communities were denied access to a resource in their own backyard, so many fishermen had to poach to survive. These injustices seem to have carried over to the new government as well, since communities have not yet gained rights of access to their resource. Although poachers are now operating to get rich and not simply to survive, they justify their activities as addressing the historical imbalances that government has yet to rectify.

A project was presented to MCM in 1997 to resolve the poaching issue in Hawston. Poachers had begun to cause social unrest through the rise of gangs and violence. Many locals were living in fear, and the sense of community had been lost. Although many discussions resulted from the 1997 proposal, nothing ever materialized. Unfortunately, the resource has now been decimated and the community is the center of illegal fishing activity and crime.

Hangklip-Kleinmond poaching situation

The municipality of Hangklip-Kleinmond has recently become the focus of abalone attention. Kleinmond was established in 1915 with the construction of the Jonesklip harbor. Today, the Hangklip-Kleinmond municipality consists of four, largely white middle class communities, two informal settlements, and the colored township of Proteadorp. Proteadorp is a traditional fishing community, and home to a large number of both legal and illegal fishermen. Conflict over the exploitation of abalone has been growing and there are now a large number of diverging role-players. There is tension between the various groups of legal fishermen as they compete over quota applications; there is tension between the legal fishermen and the poachers regarding the exploitation of the resource; and there is tension between the community policing organization and the poachers regarding the local marine reserve. Hangklip-Kleinmond is also a popular holiday destination attracting a significant number of recreational divers, which has only added to the complexity of the problem.

Quota allocations are a particular point of contention for this area. Although, the government in principle promotes local inhabitant use of marine resources like abalone and rock lobster, the Hangklip-Kleinmond community is yet to see this in action. (In_______) MCM granted 464 tons to 37 applicants ranging from all over South Africa, however not one kilogram was granted to the six applicants of Hangklip-Kleinmond. These applicants were supported by a broad spectrum of community interests including groups of fishing interests, poachers, and previously disadvantaged residents. Members of Hangklip-Kleinmond believe the wrong people are getting quotas; people who have never seen the sea are getting access to a resource that the community has lived on for decades. Exacerbating the situation is that these 47 applicants may take 85.5 tons of their total abalone catch from the Hangklip area itself. Applicants have lodged appeals, but still await a reply.

The abalone resource in the area is in a critical situation at the moment. It has not been completely decimated like the area between Hermanus and Hawstons. It has, however, experienced a decline. In fact, the stock in the legal areas of fishing has decreased so significantly that poachers have recently turned to the marine reserve located at Betty’s Bay. Betty’s Bay is one of the last places on the Western Cape where large abalone can be found. However, local fishermen and poachers do not believe their activities are responsible for the decline in their area’s stock. They say their actions are not threatening the resource simply because they do not have the equipment to do so. Fishermen believe that the divers from outside the Hangklip-Kleinmond area (e.g. Port Elizabeth, Cape Town, Hawston) pose the greatest threat to the resource because they have the necessary equipment (boats and scuba tanks) to take hundreds of abalone at a time. These divers do not depend on the resource like the local fishermen so their interest in exploiting it in a sustainable manner is minimal.

Betty’s Bay Marine Reserve

Betty’s Bay Marine Reserve has become a major focus of controversy. The reserve was supposedly created to protect the resources (abalone, crayfish and other marine life) from exploitation. It was meant to replenish the other areas of the coast and serve as a refuge for abundant marine life. The local fishermen and poachers of Hangklip-Kleinmond would beg to differ. Locals believe that the reserve was not created in the interest of the resource, but rather in the interest of the rich white homeowners in the area. They see the reserve as a means to deny access to the neighboring public, and guard the area for the exclusive use of those who own houses nearby.

The poachers do not agree with the scientists’ guidelines for establishing the reserve. First of all, they say the abalone in the reserve are so old that "their shells crumble when one picks them up." The poachers do not understand why abalone are left to die when people nearby can utilize them to alleviate poverty and hunger. Secondly, prohibiting the removal of crayfish in the reserve is actually threatening the abalone stock for the crayfish eat both the juvenile abalone and their sea urchin shelters. Finally, the poachers do not understand why they should not be able to rotate amongst the various areas. For example, the area in which locals legally fish is declining, therefore why not fish in the reserve to allow the surrounding areas to replenish? Although it is questionable whether the rationale of the local fishermen is in fact appropriate for the sustainable management of the abalone stock, these questions certainly illustrate the opposing views associated with establishing a marine protected area near a community that needs the resource.

Enforcement

One of the traditional methods used to combat marine poaching in South Africa has been to heighten measures of enforcement. As of yet, this system has not succeeded in significantly decreasing poaching, and in some situations it has only aggravated the problem. Nevertheless, enforcement is a fundamental component to solving the problem and it must be implemented if the resource is to be saved. The regulation of abalone poaching is currently managed by MCM inspectors, the local police, programs such as Operation Neptune, and such community-based organizations as Sea Watch.

MCM inspectors

Enforcement bodies within the government department are currently facing many problems. First, there is a shortage of manpower. There are 138 inspectors for the entire coast of South Africa. These inspector’s duties include patrolling, policing, harbor management, quota control, and administrative issues. Given these responsibilities, and the more than 3000 km of coastline, the government simply does not have the personnel to properly address the situation.

Secondly, inspector training is insufficient, and many lack the necessary policing skills and environmental knowledge needed to be effective. Recently, MCM scientists began a course to train inspectors in identifying abalone. As of now, the few scientists and officials who are knowledgeable in the area are so busy with court trials that they do not have time to address other more pressing issues at hand. Angus MacKenzie, a research officer for MCM, says he spends up to forty to sixty days annually dealing with poaching related matters. Unfortunately, these courses have ended, due to a lack of national recognition and financial support. This stalemate is especially frustrating given the simplicity of the work; as MacKenzie stated, "it is basically identifying a horse from a zebra." This lack of government support is making a relatively simple process extremely difficult.

South African Police Service

MCM inspectors often enlist help from the local police to aid in patrolling, policing, and monitoring the abalone resource. Although this help contributes valuable operational strategies and enforcement know-how to projects, police can also aggravate the situation. The local police have a long history of corruption that has fostered a growing mistrust in community members. Corruption can include anything from turning a blind eye to stealing confiscated stock. As a result, community members are wary and reluctant cooperate with the local police. Officers often adopt hostile tactics when handling situations, which only aggravates matters. Many officers lack training in environmental matters and marine issues, training that is key to providing effective enforcement of the regulations. Finally, those police officers that are effective enforcers are often met with long and tedious court trials. Cases drag on unnecessarily and many are dismissed on minor technicalities, making the police officers frustrated and reluctant to make future arrests.

Operation Neptune

In 1999, the government launched Operation Neptune, a program designed specifically to combat the illegal exploitation of marine resources (specifically rock lobster and abalone). Although the program was initially created to operate on the entire coast of South Africa, its efforts were concentrated between Hermanus and Hangklip. The objectives of Operation Neptune were to increase manpower and act as a visible deterrent to poaching. The program was important in that it brought the various levels of enforcement together and established channels of communication. The program provided an opportunity for MCM inspectors, local police, conservation officers, and community organizations to coordinate their efforts in targeting illegal resource exploitation.

The operation was successful in decreasing poaching but unfortunately created a number of other problems. During the operation, there was an increase in violence, housebreaking, and general hostility. Poachers who were blocked from conducting their normal activities turned to other means to release their frustration. Although the program may not have been the sole reason for this increase, it appears to have played a role. Another problem was the short duration of the program. The operation lasted only nine months due to a shortage of funds, and when the program ended, poaching skyrocketed. This dramatic increase in criminal activity offset any decrease in poaching during the nine months, making the overall impact minimal. Poachers also stated that although they were initially wary of continuing their activities, they later realized that the benefits of harvesting outweighed the risk of getting caught and punished. Many poachers simply modified their behavior to the operation either through working at night or operating in smaller, less visible groups. Finally, Operation Neptune caused tension within the enforcement bodies themselves. The program was successful in increasing communication and coordination between the various bodies, but it also resulted in a question of turf. Often disputes would arise during prosecution over whose case it was or who officially made the arrest. These conflicts made effective enforcement hard to achieve.

Sea Watch

Sea Watch is a community-based organization located in the Hangklip-Kleinmond municipality. Established in 1995 by five local people, the organization has now become a public figure and formal community structure. Community members were disillusioned with government’s inaction to address the heightened poaching in the area, so they decided to take matters into their own hands. Sea Watch, as written in their mission statement, wishes

‘to re-establish a healthy and harmonious relationship between people (such as divers, fisherfolk, and boaters) and the sea, so that all people can enjoy and harvest from the sea while fostering and protecting the resource.’

Its objectives, as listed in their constitution, are to patrol and monitor the resource, increase public awareness and education, encourage community participation, and promote policy transformation.

Policing and monitoring has been improved through the posting of signs around Betty’s Bay Reserve and other key points along the coast. These signs provide the Sea Watch telephone number and encourage witnesses of poaching to report them. Many members also live around the reserve, which facilitates their ability to monitor illegal activity. Sea Watch has established a certain rapport with local poachers, so identification of cars and faces is somewhat easy. Sea Watch members are also honorary MCM inspectors, and have the power to check permits and confiscate illegal catch.

Sea Watch has succeeded in increasing public awareness by publishing annual reports, writing articles in the local newspapers, distributing pamphlets, coordinating youth excursions, and conducting public meetings. In 1999, Sea Watch helped to establish the Hangklip-Kleinmond Coastal Management Forum. The Forum was intended to provide a mechanism for discussing issues surrounding marine resource management. A significant achievement of Sea Watch has been establishing links between the community and trustworthy officials. As stated before, the corruption of the police and officials have posed a problem in gaining trust and compliance of community members. By interacting with officials both in training courses and discussion forums, Sea Watch has helped the community gain a certain measure of trust in the authorities.

As with any enforcement body, Sea Watch has a number of problems associated with its activities. One is its all-white racial composition. In a color-sensitive nation like South Africa, a white policing body enforcing measures over predominantly non-white perpetrators is only going to cause conflict. Many poachers have viewed Sea Watch operations as an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ situation. Sea Watch’s emphasis on patrolling and policing has only aggravated this sensitive situation. Several poachers complain that Sea Watch members often engage in unwarranted enforcement actions. For example, if they are seen walking near the reserve, a member will follow them or attempt to do a search. Adding to the tension is the fact that many of the Sea Watch members made their fortunes off the very abalone that they are now trying to protect. Poachers who walk by the huge mansions of Betty’s Bay feel anger and frustration towards these people who are now trying to stop them from achieving the same financial gai